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THE U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE IMPASSE: 
TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS 
Michael F. McBride and Robin M. Rotman  ∗
 For several years there has been an impasse, in the 
political branches, over how to make progress on dealing 
with the intractable problem of nuclear waste disposal in 
the United States.  Currently, over 120 sites, spread across 
39 states, host commercial spent fuel—many of these sites 
are former reactors that have become de facto interim 
nuclear waste storage sites, pending a permanent solution.   10
Transportation considerations are central in this discussion.  
With the potential for Congress to make progress on this 
issue following the 2018 midterm elections, this article 
reviews the potential paths forward and considers possible 
implications for the transportation sector.   
 Michael F. McBride is a partner at Van Ness Feldman, LLP, with over 40 years of ∗
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 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act 2018, Frequently Asked Questions About 10
H.R. 3053 and Nuclear Waste, at 1, https://energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/NWPAA_FAQ_05072018.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
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How Did We Get Here? 
 Shortly after the dawn of the nuclear age, it became 
apparent that waste would be created that would have long 
half-lives and therefore require long-term isolation to 
protect human health and the environment.  Consideration 
was given to a wide range of options—including disposing 
of the waste in an abandoned salt mine in Kansas, sending 
it to outer space, or even putting it at the bottom of the 
ocean.  All were rejected for various geologic and technical 
reasons. 
 In 1982, with the support of the nuclear industry, 
Congress took a major step toward a solution, enacting the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”).   The NWPA 11
committed the federal government to taking title to, and 
responsibility for, disposal of commercial spent fuel, in 
addition to the defense wastes for which it was already 
responsible.  Congress recognized that, as a practical 
matter, only the federal government has the ability to 
oversee permanent nuclear waste disposal.  The NWPA 
required the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to evaluate 
potential sites for permanent, underground disposal of high-
level nuclear waste, subject to licensing by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), and appropriated funds 
for this purpose.   
 The NWPA required DOE to begin accepting 
commercial spent fuel by January 31, 1998.   DOE entered 12
into enforceable contracts with NRC reactor licensees 
 Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–11
10270).
 Id. § 302(a)(5)(B), 96 Stat. 2258.12
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(“Licensees”) to carry out its responsibilities, which 
prescribed that generators pay a fee of 1.0 mil/kwh from 
nuclear-generated electricity to fund disposal activities.    13
 Initially, sites in as many as ten States were under 
consideration for a repository.  Over time, DOE narrowed 
the list to Nevada, Texas, and the State of Washington.  In 
1987, Congress determined that the sites in Texas and 
Washington were too politically sensitive.  In what has 
come to be referred to in Nevada media as the “Screw 
Nevada Bill,” Congress amended the NWPA to direct DOE 
to evaluate only Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a possible 
disposal site (“Yucca Mountain Project” or “Project”), and 
thereafter Congress provided appropriations specifically for 
the Project.  14
 When it became clear that DOE would not meet its 
obligation to begin accepting commercial spent fuel by 
January 31, 1998, a number of States and Licensees sued 
for specific performance, i.e., to get a court to force DOE to 
accept the spent fuel.   The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 15
District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) found that 
DOE was in violation of NWPA by refusing to accept 
commercial spent fuel.   Because the federal government 16
lacked a place where it could safely accept the spent fuel, 
the D.C. Circuit did not force DOE to start accepting spent 
fuel, but instead suggested that the Licensees could pursue 
 Id. § 302(a)(3), 96 Stat. 2258; 42 U.S.C. § 10222.13
 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 §§ 5001–5065, 14
101 Stat. 1330, 1330–227 to –255.
 See, e.g., Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996); N. States 15
Power Co. v. DOE, 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. DOE, 211 F.
3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 653 
(2006), rev’d, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 Ind. Mich. Power, 88 F.3d at 1276.16
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damages before the U.S. Court of Claims.   The U.S. 17
Court of Claims found that DOE was in breach of the 
contracts with Licensees regarding nuclear waste disposal, 
and ordered DOE to pay damages to the Licensees to 
reimburse their costs of storing spent fuel on-site at their 
facilities.   Payment is made out of the Judgment Fund, a 18
permanent appropriation by Congress to pay judgments 
entered against the United States.   The longer the waste 19
sits, the more the government will need to compensate 
Licensees for its inaction.  Recent reports are that the 
government’s annual liability for these damages is 
approximately $800 million,  and that amount will 20
continue to increase. 
DOE Makes Progress—For a Time 
 In February 2002, DOE released its assessment of the 
suitability of the Yucca Mountain site, concluding that the 
site was safe for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear 
waste.   President George W. Bush accepted DOE’s 21
analysis and determined that DOE should proceed with 
Yucca Mountain as the site of the nation’s nuclear 
 See N. States Power, 128 F.3d at 759-60.  17
 Entergy Nuclear FitzPatrick, LLC v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 739, 745-48 (2010), 18
reconsideration denied, 101 Fed. Cl. 464 (2011), aff’d, 711 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
 Mark Holt, Congressional Research Service, RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste 19
Disposal 12 (updated Sept. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33461.pdf.
 See Nuclear Energy Institute, Used Nuclear Fuel https://www.nei.org/advocacy/make-20
regulations-smarter/used-nuclear-fuel (last visited Nov. 26, 2018); see also DOE, Agency 
Financial Report, at 78 (FY 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/05/f51/
fy-2017-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf.
 See DOE, Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the 21
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, 




repository.   Under the NWPA, however, the Governor of 22
Nevada had a right to veto the Project, subject to a 
Congressional override.   Governor Kenny Guinn 23
exercised Nevada’s veto right, but Congress overrode the 
veto, and continued to appropriate funds for the Project.   24
As a result, DOE was able to proceed and, in 2008, filed its 
application with the NRC for a Project license.    25
 The Obama Administration, however, opposed the 
Project as “not a workable option”—a position that the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and others 
have characterized as a policy decision, not based on 
technical or safety factors.   In March 2010, DOE filed a 26
motion with the NRC to withdraw its license application.   27
The move was applauded by then-Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid (D-NV), a long-time opponent of the Project.  
In June 2010, the NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board (“ASLB”) denied the motion 3-0, on grounds that 
the NWPA did not authorize DOE to withdraw the license 
application without Congressional approval.   Despite the 28
ASLB Decision, in October 2010, then-Chairman of the 
 See Matthew L. Wald, Bury the Nation’s Nuclear Waste in Nevada, Bush Says, N.Y. 22
Times (Feb. 16, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/us/bury-the-nation-s-
nuclear-waste-in-nevada-bush-says.html.
 NWPA §§ 115(b), 115(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135(b), 10135(c).23
 See Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002) (approving the site at Yucca Mountain, 24
Nevada, for the development of a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive 
waste and spent nuclear fuel, pursuant to the NWPA).
 See generally NRC, DOE’s License Application for a High-Level Waste Geologic 25
Repository at Yucca Mountain (June 3, 2008), https://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/
yucca-lic-app.html.
 See GAO, Commercial Nuclear Waste:  Effects of a Termination of the Yucca 26
Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned, at 11-13 (Apr. 2011), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/320/317627.pdf.
 See DOE’s Motion to Withdraw, In re DOE, NRC 63-001-HLW (Mar. 3, 2010), https://27
www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1006/ML100621397.pdf. 
 See In re DOE, 71 NRC 609, 618-30 (2010) (“ASLB Decision”), pet. for review 28
dismissed, In re Aiken Cty., 645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011), subsequent mandamus 
proceeding, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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NRC, Gregory Jaczko, ordered the Staff to terminate 
review of the application and not spend the remaining 
funds that had been appropriated for the NRC licensing 
proceeding.   At that time, the NRC had over $11 million 29
remaining in appropriated funds that it had not spent.  In 
September 2011, the Commission split 2-2 on appeal, 
leaving the ASLB Decision in effect under NRC rules.    30
 Because of the apparent determination of DOE to 
terminate the Project, several parties with interests in long-
term nuclear waste disposal sought judicial relief, including 
Aiken County, South Carolina as the named lead petitioner 
(home to the Savannah River nuclear production site) and 
the State of Washington (home to the Hanford Reservation 
DOE nuclear weapons site).   Their first effort, against 31
President Obama, DOE and NRC, did not succeed. Yet 
then-Judge Brown, in a concurring opinion, suggested that 
the Petitioners could instead move to compel agency action 
unlawfully delayed, given the NRC’s inaction.   The 32
Petitioners did so.  Eventually, the D.C. Circuit took the 
rare step of issuing a writ of mandamus, compelling the 
NRC to use the remaining appropriated funds on Project 
licensing proceedings.   Separately, the same Court also 33
suspended the NWPA Program Fee, on the grounds that the 
agency could not produce an adequate assessment of the 
 See Memorandum to Office Directors and Regional Administrators From J.E. Dyer, 29
Chief Financial Officer, NRC, Guidance Under a Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing 
Resolution (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.thenwsc.org/ym/
YM%20NRC.CFO%20Memo%20to%20Staff%20re%20CR%20100410.pdf; see also 
725 F.3d at 267-68 (Randolph, J., concurring) (citing NRC, Office of the Inspector 
General, OIG Case No. 11-05, NRC Chairman’s Unilateral Decision to Terminate NRC’s 
Review of DOE Yucca Mountain Repository License Application (June 6, 2011)).
 See In re DOE, 74 NRC 368 (2011); see also In re DOE, 74 NRC 212 (2011). 30
 In re Aiken Cty., 645 F.3d 428.31
 See id. at 438.32
 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d at 266.33
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appropriate amount of the fee in light of numerous 
uncertainties.   The D.C. Circuit also upheld the NRC’s 34
“Continued Storage Rule,” which permits on-site storage of 
commercial spent fuel for the indefinite future, finding that 
the NRC had a rational basis and substantial evidence for 
its conclusion that it would be safe to continue to store 
spent fuel indefinitely at reactor sites.  35
 In compliance with the writ of mandamus, the NRC 
resumed work on the Project licensing proceeding, issuing 
a Safety Evaluation Report and a Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement.  At present, the funds 
have mostly been expended, and the NRC has informed 
Congress that it would need approximately $330 million to 
complete the Project licensing.   The D.C. Circuit’s writ of 36
mandamus does not require the NRC to perform unfunded 
work.  
  
 To date, Congress has not appropriated any additional 
funds.  That is where matters stand on the Yucca Mountain 
Project—it is stalled because Congress has been unable to 
agree on additional appropriations. 
Meanwhile…. 
 Although the Obama Administration opposed the 
Project, it attempted to address the nuclear waste issue by 
creating the “Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 
Nuclear Future” (“BRC”), an advisory committee to the 
Secretary of Energy.  The BRC published a report in 
 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  34
 New York v. NRC, 824 F.3d 1012, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2016).35
 See Holt, supra, note 10, at 2 & n.9 (at 2 & n.9) (citing 2015 Congressional testimony 36
of NRC Chairman Burns)
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January 2012.   As directed by the Secretary of Energy, the 37
BRC did not opine on any particular site for nuclear waste 
disposal, nor did it opine on the merits of the Project in 
particular.  It did support geologic disposal of nuclear waste 
by the federal government and, among other things, 
supported what it termed “consent-based siting,” in the 
wake of Nevada’s staunch opposition to the Project.    38
 In December 2015, DOE launched efforts to promote 
consent-based siting, and held meetings around the country 
to encourage a State to volunteer to host a nuclear waste 
disposal site in exchange for money and other benefits.  In 
the wake of the BRC Report, the Bipartisan Policy Center 
started its “Nuclear Waste Initiative,” pursuant to which it 
issued a series of white papers and a report endorsing 
consent-based siting. 
Transportation Implications 
 Safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel is a key 
component of the nuclear waste solution.  The vast majority 
of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste that is moved 
in the United States is transported by rail.  Although there 
has never been a release of high-level nuclear waste when 
transported in an NRC-approved spent fuel storage cask, 
public opposition to nuclear waste disposal sites often 
focuses on perceived transportation risks.   
 With respect to the Yucca Mountain Project, a large 
volume of spent nuclear fuel would be transported to the 
 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of 37
Energy (Jan. 2012) (“BRC Report”), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/
brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
 See id. at 47-59.38
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site over the course of many years, shipped predominantly 
by rail, and to a much lesser extent, by truck.  Nevada state 
officials lament that a rail line that would carry spent 
nuclear fuel to the site passes within a half-mile of the Las 
Vegas Strip.  A train derailment with a subsequent release 
of nuclear materials (even though that is an exceedingly 
improbable event) could expose railroad employees, first 
responders, residents and visitors to high levels of 
radiation.   The volume and frequency of shipments, even 39
without a release, could also generate concerns for 
transportation workers in the Las Vegas area, who may 
require radiation exposure monitoring.    
Some Yucca Mountain opponents argue for 
decentralized repositories so that waste does not need to be 
transported as far.  To the extent that transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is transported 
fewer miles as a result of having more than one disposal 
site, the transportation risk would necessarily be less 
because the overall miles the spent fuel would be 
transported would be less.  Whether there are other risks 
that might increase in such a scenario—such as whether 
having more than one repository increases overall risk—
depends on the comparative assessment of risks associated 
with the particular sites, and would have to be considered 
by the NRC during licensing of each specific site.   
 See Bobby Magill, Nevadans Prep for Yucca Battle Even as Funding Faces Long Odds, 39





A Continued Impasse? 
 For several years, it was thought in Washington, D.C. 
that the unwillingness of Congress to appropriate further 
funds for the Yucca Mountain Project licensing proceeding 
was due to the political clout of Harry Reid (D-NV), the 
then-Senate Majority Leader.  Some lawmakers assumed 
that when Harry Reid left the Senate, the Yucca Mountain 
Project would go through.  The election of President Trump 
bolstered these assumptions.  Although President Trump 
did not take a position on the Yucca Mountain Project 
during the 2016 elections, he has largely appeared to 
support the Project, and his proposed budget for 2019 
recommended that Congress appropriate approximately 
$48 million to NRC, and $120 million to DOE, to resume 
Project licensing activities.   Further, on May 10, 2018, the 40
House passed, by a 340-72 vote, legislation (H.R. 3053) to 
amend the NWPA, provide funding for the Project, and 
promote centralized interim storage of commercial spent 
 See Dep’t of Energy FY 2019 Budget Request Fact Sheet at 3 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://40
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f48/
Energy%20Department%20FY%202019%20Budget%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf; Press 
Release, NRC, NRC Proposes FY 2019 Budget to Congress (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2018/18-005.pdf; see also Office of 
Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, An American Budget, Fiscal 
Year 2019, at 45-48, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/budget-
fy2019.pdf.  But note that on October 20, 2018, while in Nevada campaigning for Sen. 
Dean Heller (R-NV), President Trump stated during a television interview: “I think you 
should do things where people want them to happen, so I would be very inclined to be 
against [the Project].”  He remarked that “[w]e will be looking at it very seriously over 
the next few weeks, and I agree with the people of Nevada.”  Seung Min Kim, Trump 
Signals Opposition to Nuclear Waste Site in Nevada Despite His Budget Proposals to 
Fund It, The Washington Post, Oct. 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-signals-opposition-to-nuclear-waste-site-in-nevada-despite-his-budget-proposals-
to-fund-it/2018/10/21/50eff246-d571-11e8-9559-712cbf726d1c_story.html?utm_term=.
718bb8e02ba5&wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1.  On October 26, 2018, Energy Secretary 
Rick Perry reiterated President Trump’s support for the Yucca Mountain Project.  See Ari 
Natter and Brian Eckhouse, Perry Says White House Still Backs Nevada Nuclear Dump, 




fuel while the Project is under consideration (and, 
eventually, construction, if licensed by the NRC). 
 But yet the Project still seems to be going nowhere fast.  
Why? 
 It turns out that “The Trouble with Harry” became “The 
Trouble with Mitch,” i.e., Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the 
current Senate Majority Leader.  Leader McConnell had a 
majority of only 51-49 heading into the 2018 elections, and 
wanted to maintain, or grow, the Republican majority if at 
all possible.  He reportedly did not allow the Project to 
come up for an appropriations vote in the run-up to the 
2018 midterms, in an effort to allow Senator Dean Heller 
(R-NV), a long-time opponent of the Project, to score 
political points with his Nevada constituency by continuing 
to claim to block the Project.   Indeed, during his 41
campaign, Senator Heller took credit for ensuring that a 
Yucca Mountain Project licensing funding request by DOE 
and NRC was excluded from the Energy and Water, 
Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans 
Affairs appropriations bill passed by the Senate in June 
2018.   He also touted successful efforts in removing a $30 42
million Project appropriation from the John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.   43
 Rep. John Shimkus (R-IL) lamented that “As we’ve allowed for a decade now, a single 41
senator’s short-term political calculations again triumphed over long-term, bipartisan 
policy priorities.”  Gary Martin, Congressman:  Political Considerations Derailing Yucca 
Mountain, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Sept. 12, 2018, https://www.reviewjournal.com/
news/politics-and-government/nevada/congressman-political-considerations-derailing-
yucca-mountain/. 
 See Press Release, Dean Heller, U.S. Senator for Nevada, Heller Successfully Keeps 42
Funding for Yucca Mountain Out of Appropriations Bill Approved by the U.S. Senate 
(June 25, 2018), https://www.heller.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/6/heller-
successfully-keeps-funding-for-yucca-mountain-out-of-appropriations-bill-approved-by-
the-u-s-senate. 
 See id. 43
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Despite these efforts, Senator Heller was defeated in the 
2018 midterms by Congresswoman Jacky Rosen (D-NV), 
who also opposes the Project.  
  
 With the 2018 elections now behind us, the question 
remains:  Will Congress finally break the impasse?  Or will 
it find another excuse to again avoid this nettlesome issue? 
 Given the strong Congressional support the Project has 
enjoyed in the past, given that geologic disposal is the 
preferred technical means of dealing with the nuclear waste 
problem, given that the federal government has already 
spent approximately $11 billion on the Project,  and given 44
that DOE’s obligations to pay Licensees’ on-site storage 
costs already has amounted to at least $6.9 billion, and may 
eventually exceed $34 billion,  it is widely believed that 45
Congress will appropriate funds for the Project after the 
2018 midterm elections.  But the long and troubled history 
of the Project suggests caution in relying on that belief.   
 At some point, though, Congress must appropriate 
funds to do something about nuclear waste storage and 
disposal.  
 See American Legislative Exchange Council, Resolution Urging the President and 44
Congress to Abide by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to Establish a Permanent 
Geologic Repository for Used Nuclear Fuel and Defense-Related High-Level Radioactive 




 See Holt, supra, note 10, at 12 & n.57; see also id. at 42 (others predicted that future 45
damages could rise by tens of billions of dollars more if the federal disposal program fails 
altogether).
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